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SEX AND RELIGION: UNHOLY BEDFELLOWS
Mary-Rose Papandrea*
Sex and the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law from
America’s Origins to the Twenty-First Century. By Geoffrey
R. Stone. New York and London: Liveright Publishing Corporation.
2017. Pp. xxxii, 529. $35.
Introduction
In a lecture delivered in 2008, University of Chicago professor Geoffrey
Stone1 confessed to the audience that he had been working on a book tenta-
tively titled “Sexing the Constitution,” a project of “reckless ambition.”2 Al-
most ten years later, the book has hit the stands, renamed Sex and the
Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law from America’s Origins to the Twenty-
First Century, at a time when debates about sex and religion are more heated
than ever. Beginning with a survey of law and sexuality in Greek and Roman
times, the book ends with an analysis of the Supreme Court’s same-sex mar-
riage decisions and their aftermath. The breadth of the work is staggering.
Stone covers so much territory in this book, including (but definitely
not limited to) Saint Augustine’s role in the evolution of Christianity’s views
on sexuality and sin; Anthony Comstock’s role in the widespread passage of
repressive laws banning pornography, birth control, and abortion; the lim-
ited role Roe v. Wade3 actually played in fermenting the rise of the pro-life
movement; the history of the gay rights movement in the United States; the
dramatic increase in public toleration for same-sex relationships and mar-
riages; changes in communications technology that have undermined efforts
to control explicit sexual images; methods of constitutional interpretation—
the list goes on and on. Any of these topics could be—and have been—the
subject of their own books. In the final analysis, though, Stone’s primary
thesis becomes clear: religious groups and individuals have, at various times
throughout Western history, used the secular law to foist their beliefs upon
nonbelievers.
Stone suggests that he disapproves of this religious influence in the law,
but he wisely recognizes the limits of any argument that this influence is
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1. Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School.
2. Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1,
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3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has never struck down a law because
religious groups and individuals have advocated for the law on religious
grounds, and Stone contends that to do so would violate both the Free Exer-
cise and the Freedom of Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. He argues
that courts should—and do—consider whether there is any justification for
a law aside from religious reasons, and some laws will fail under this inquiry.
But he recognizes that the universe of such cases is very small. His most
ambitious argument is that laws that are based on “morality” alone are un-
constitutional “[b]ecause of the clear religious overtones implicit in such
‘moral’ justifications” (p. 331). But this leaves open the possibility that laws
will survive constitutional scrutiny as long as the government can come up
with some other justification.
A second, much less developed theme that emerges from the history
Stone shares with us is that many of the laws discussed in the book reflect
anxiety and apprehension about the appropriate gender roles of men and
women. Many organized religions, especially those that are most active and
influential in our political debates, reflect rigid views of sexuality and gen-
der. This suggests that rather than attack sex-related laws as attempts by
religious groups to foist their beliefs on secular society—an endeavor Stone
himself recognizes is largely doomed to failure—it may be more productive
to attack these rigid conceptions of gender roles directly through equal pro-
tection challenges. Although this approach will not necessarily lead to the
results that progressives desire in every case, it is more promising as a practi-
cal matter.
Part I of this Review focuses on Stone’s attempt to correct some com-
mon misunderstandings regarding the history of laws relating to sex. Stone’s
focus on history naturally raises the larger issue of what role history should
play in interpreting the Constitution. This Part focuses specifically on some
unresolved questions regarding the proper role of history in the Court’s free-
dom-of-expression jurisprudence. Part II turns to Stone’s examination of
the role that religion and religious organizations have played in the political
process and sometimes the judicial process. Part III argues that Stone’s his-
tory of laws relating to sex reflects anxiety about the proper roles of men and
women in society and supports a more robust role for the Equal Protection
Clause as a means of attacking laws relating to sex.
I. The Role of History
The first half of Stone’s book focuses on the history of laws relating to
sex centuries before the Supreme Court issued a single decision in this area.
Very readable and endlessly fascinating, Stone’s historical work is a treasure
trove of information for any scholar, law student, or interested citizen won-
dering how we got where we are today.
In addition to the pure educational value of this history, the most obvi-
ous reason a constitutional law scholar would dive into the history of sex-
related laws is that this history is arguably relevant for interpreting the Con-
stitution. And as Stone has said elsewhere, if that history is going to matter,
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we should get that history correct.4 Stone’s book points out various histori-
cal errors the Court has made, while also making the case for a more expan-
sive view of fundamental liberties that does not rest on the identification of
narrowly defined traditions for support.
Because Stone’s book sweeps broadly to include a discussion about laws
restricting the freedom of expression, his history covers laws restricting ob-
scenity, child pornography, profanity, and nudity. While Stone does argue
that there is no relevant historical tradition prohibiting sexually explicit
speech, Stone does not specifically address what role history should play, if
any, in interpreting the First Amendment. To date, the Court has not been
clear what role history should play in determining the scope of the First
Amendment. Frequently, the Court has ignored or discounted history and
has instead relied more heavily on various theories that justify protections
for speech and expressive activities. In recent decisions, however, history has
played a greater role. If this trend continues, the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence could change dramatically.
A. Correcting History
Debates about the role of history with respect to substantive due process
and, to a lesser extent, equal protection, have played a significant role in the
Court’s decisions and in the scholarly literature. Even the Court’s progres-
sives have frequently said that history is a starting point for constitutional
interpretation, even if it is not determinative.5 One of the goals of Stone’s
book is to set us all straight on the history of laws relating to sex.
In the case of sex-related laws, the relevant history helps progressives in
some instances but not others. In many instances, the usefulness depends on
whether the relevant history is the time of the nation’s founding or when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. For example, as Justice Blackmun rec-
ognized in his summary of the history of abortion laws in Roe v. Wade,
restrictions on abortion, at least before “quickening,” did not exist at the
founding;6 in dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the majority of
states did have laws against abortion when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified.7 Although the Court did not discuss the history of laws banning
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut,8 Stone points out that, at the time
4. “Whether you fancy yourself an originalist or an interpretivist, a champion of a living
Constitution or a dead hand,” and whatever constitutional provision or issue you are analyz-
ing, “it helps to know the truth about the Framers, about what they believed, and about what
they aspired to when they created this nation.” Stone, supra note 2, at 25–26.
5. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“History and tradition
guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”).
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129–41 (summarizing the history of abortion laws in England and
the United States).
7. See id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There apparently was no question con-
cerning the validity of this provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.”).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of the nation’s founding, there were no laws banning the use of contracep-
tives; like laws banning abortion, however, such laws became common dur-
ing the Second Great Awakening.9
In other cases, members of the Court have disagreed about what the
relevant history is or how to characterize it. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the ma-
jority, rejecting a constitutional challenge to Georgia’s antisodomy law, ex-
plained that laws against sodomy had “ancient roots” and existed in all or
most states both at the time of our founding and when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868.10 In Lawrence v. Texas, however, Justice
Kennedy explained in his opinion for the majority that “there is no long-
standing history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter.”11 In some instances, the history is not at all helpful for
progressives—for example, there is an almost total lack of history of same-
sex marriages until relatively recently. In such instances, the more progres-
sive justices have embraced a broader view of fundamental rights rather than
the specific laws or traditions that existed at our founding.12
As these foregoing examples illustrate, even if history matters, determin-
ing what the relevant history is can be debatable. Historical inquiries are
often inherently difficult, and as an institution, the Court is not particularly
competent at undertaking these inquiries. But one possible takeaway from
Stone’s book is that liberals should not be too quick to concede that history
and tradition are against them, because in many instances, history and tradi-
tion are on their side. This is particularly true if the relevant history is what
was going on when our nation was founded (and not what was going on in
1868, following the religious fervor of the Second Great Awakening).
Stone argues that in the sexual-expression cases where the Court has
looked to history for guidance, it has often gotten that history wrong or at a
minimum misinterpreted it. For example, the Court has declared that his-
tory and tradition support its recognition of obscenity as a category of un-
protected speech.13 In Roth v. United States, Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, explained that at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment,
thirteen of fourteen states allowed for the prosecution of libel and all states
criminalized blasphemy and profanity.14 Brennan conceded that at the time
the First Amendment was adopted, “obscenity law was not as fully devel-
oped as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to
9. See pp. 127–28, 147.
10. 478 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1986).
11. 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003). Justice Scalia countered that what is relevant is that sodomy
has always been criminalized. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Whether homosexual sodomy
was prohibited by a law targeted at same-sex sexual relations or by a more general law prohib-
iting both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, the only relevant point is that it was
criminalized . . . .”).
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015).
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957).
14. Id. at 482.
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show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and
press.”15
Stone casts significant doubt on the historical basis for obscenity as a
category of unprotected speech. Until the 1700s, he tells us, the only time
people ever got in trouble for their sexually explicit speech was when it also
was “blasphemous, seditious, [or] heretical” (pp. 55–59). In the eighteenth
century, obscenity prosecutions in England were “sporadic,” even though
London “was awash” with “sexually-explicit” literature, prints, and sex
manuals (pp. 63–64, 67). In the colonies, the situation was similar. Despite
the widespread availability of sexually explicit books and erotic fiction,
“[t]here were no prosecutions for obscenity during the entire colonial era,”
(p. 83), and at the time the Constitution was adopted, “there were no laws in
the United States against obscenity” (p. 127). The first American obscenity
prosecution did not occur until 1815 (p. 146). Stone later concludes that
Justice Brennan “was simply wrong” when he determined in his majority
opinion in Roth that the original understanding of the First Amendment
excluded obscenity (p. 273).
Similarly, Stone suggests that the Court arguably misinterpreted history
in its nude-dancing cases. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court relied on
the long-standing history of laws banning public nudity to uphold the appli-
cation of a state antinudity law to nude dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge.16
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that “[p]ublic inde-
cency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin” and “[p]ublic indecency was
a criminal offense at common law.”17 As Stone explains, however, the history
of laws banning nude erotic dances is hardly clear. In ancient times, nude
dancing was common, and even though the Christian church cracked down
on nude dancing in the seventh century, by the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, stripteases had become very common throughout Europe
(p. 327). Stone does not make clear whether nude dancing was forbidden at
our nation’s founding, but he does explain how erotic dancing and bur-
lesque performances were very common in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, casting doubt on the claim that nude dancing has always
been criminalized (pp. 327–28).
B. History and the Freedom of Speech
Although debates about history have played a big role in the Court’s
decisions relating to abortion, sodomy, and same-sex marriage, the Court
has more inconsistently paid attention to history in its First Amendment
decisions. More often, the Court has relied on various theories of the First
Amendment—such as self-government and the marketplace of ideas—to
15. Id. at 483.
16. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
17. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.
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justify its decisions.18 In addition, when the Court or its various members
have invoked history (or relied on some form of originalism), it is often to
support a robust reading of the First Amendment.
The earliest First Amendment decisions from the Court, which largely
dealt with speech that advocated unlawful conduct, quickly abandoned his-
tory as a tool for determining the scope of protection for expressive rights.
In Schenck v. United States, the first decision in which the Court considered
the meaning of the First Amendment, the Court noted that “it may well be
that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined
to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main
purpose.”19 The Court did not, however, let this original understanding be
determinative.20 Although the Court concluded that the speech at issue was
not protected, the Court indicated that the speech “would have been within
[the defendants’] constitutional rights” if it had not been uttered in
wartime.21
The Court has also downplayed the importance of the Sedition Act of
1798. In his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes re-
jected the government’s argument that the First Amendment does not pro-
tect criticism of the government, despite the common law of seditious libel
and the passage of the Sedition Act in 1798, because in his view, “the United
States through many years had shown its repentance” for this law by repay-
ing fines that were imposed under it.22 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court did not let the widespread common law acceptance of libel law deter
it from holding that defamatory statements about public officials are consti-
tutionally protected unless they are made with actual malice.23 In addition,
the Court actually used the Sedition Act of 1798 to support its holding,
stating that although the Court had never ruled on its constitutionality, “the
lesson to be drawn from the great controversy” over that Act demonstrates a
consensus that the First Amendment protects criticism of the government.24
The Sullivan Court ultimately rested its conclusion on theories of self-gov-
ernance and the marketplace of ideas.25 The Court has also not let history
18. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlighted self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”); id. at 353 (noting that a
campaign-finance restriction “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the
First Amendment” (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008))); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”).
19. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
24. Id. at 273–74.
25. Id. at 269.
April 2018] Sex and Religion: Unholy Bedfellows 865
constrain it in a number other decisions, including decisions relating to
commercial speech26 and child pornography.27
History appears to play a greater role in the Court’s recent First Amend-
ment opinions. In United States v. Stevens, for example, the Court rejected
the government’s argument that the Court could recognize new categories of
unprotected speech by balancing the value of speech against its costs.28 Call-
ing this proposed test “startling and dangerous,”29 the almost-unanimous
Court declared that unprotected categories of speech must be based on his-
tory and tradition.30 The Court relied on Stevens in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, where it struck down imposing restrictions on the sale of
violent video games to children.31 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held
that there is no “longstanding tradition” restricting children’s access to vio-
lence.32 Scalia did not give evidence about minors’ consumption of violent
materials at the nation’s founding but instead gave a laundry list of books
children traditionally read in this country, from Grimm’s Fairy Tales to Ho-
mer’s The Odyssey.33 He brushed aside efforts from the 1800s to the 1950s to
restrict minors’ access to dime-store novels, movies, comic books, television,
and music lyrics.34 Scalia did not explain why these various efforts to protect
children are irrelevant,35 but he did note that most of them failed. Although
it is tempting to dismiss this reliance on history as simply consistent with
Justice Scalia’s usual penchant for tradition, it is important to note that al-
most all the justices joined Scalia’s opinion. Although it is hard to know for
certain the Court dynamics behind these decisions, it seems at least plausible
that a majority of justices could have written separate opinions that did not
rely so heavily on history.
Justice Thomas is particularly fond of historical arguments. In his Brown
dissent, Justice Thomas argued for a different historical approach and a cate-
gorical exclusion of “speech to minor children bypassing their parents.”36
This dissent mirrored his concurrence in Morse v. Frederick, in which he
advocated for overturning Tinker.37 At least one scholar has criticized
26. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (holding that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, even
though commercial speech was historically not protected).
27. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (recognizing child pornography as
a category of unprotected speech, despite lack of historical tradition).
28. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
29. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
30. Id. at 468. Only Justice Alito dissented. Id. at 463.
31. 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
32. Brown, 564 U.S. at 795.
33. Id. at 795–96.
34. Id. at 797–98.
35. See id. at 798.
36. Id. at 822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. 551 U.S. 393, 410–12 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
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Thomas’s historical analysis, pointing out that “[t]here is no mention of
ratification debates, framer understandings of the text of the First Amend-
ment, or any historical source even remotely connected to the framing and
ratification of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment.”38 Thomas
has also made lengthy historical arguments in other cases such as Virginia v.
Black, where he discussed the connection between cross burning and
intimidation.39
It is unclear how important history will be for the Court as it continues
to confront knotty First Amendment issues. The way history is used will
make a big difference in the future of the Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence. If the Court continues to invoke history on an ad hoc basis, the direc-
tion of the Court is obviously unpredictable. If history is used in a narrow,
restrictive way to demonstrate what speech was—or wasn’t—protected at
our founding, then there may be a dramatic change in the First Amendment
landscape down the road. On one end of the extreme, if the Blackstonian
view of the First Amendment explains the true original meaning of the First
Amendment, “then arguably 90 percent of modern free speech jurispru-
dence—which goes well beyond Blackstone’s prohibition against prior re-
straints—is intellectually dishonest and historically illegitimate.”40 Even if
the Blackstonian view is rejected (either because it does not accurately re-
present the views of our founders or because embracing it would be incon-
sistent with stare decisis), incorporating history into a First Amendment
analysis would change the way the Court makes decisions in this area. At the
very least, the Court’s decisions pertaining to obscenity and libel are subject
to revision, and new laws, like laws against blasphemy and profanity, might
be constitutional.
If history matters, the Court is likely to find itself struggling to find
analogies between historical practices and modern-day questions that were
unthinkable to our framers. This is the approach Scalia took in Brown,
where he discussed The Odyssey when analyzing protections for violent
video games.41 In other instances, the Court might twist the historical narra-
tive in a way to suit a desired outcome. Justice Thomas took this approach in
his Morse dissent, where he argued that educators have historically exercised
great control over their students’ speech, even though very few public
schools existed at the founding, and when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, public schools were only just opening.42
38. Matthew D. Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New Original-
ism,” Interpretive Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 17 Comm. L. & Pol’y 329, 344
(2012).
39. 538 U.S. 343, 389–91 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 32 (1992).
41. Brown, 564 U.S. at 795–99.
42. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–12 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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As the Court grapples with new challenges to its current freedom of
expression jurisprudence, which includes less protection for certain catego-
ries of speech and strict scrutiny for content-based speech restrictions,43 it
might be appealing to cling to history as an alternative and seemingly certain
mode of interpretation. Stone teaches us, however, that various members of
the Court might not like the history they discover. In addition, a historical
analysis fails to take into account the broader purposes of the First Amend-
ment or the value (or harm) certain types of speech can cause. All the usual
criticisms of looking to historical tradition in substantive due process cases
apply with equal if not greater force when determining the scope of protec-
tions for speech under the First Amendment.
II. Religion, Sex, and Politics
In addition to correcting the historical record on specific sex-related
laws, Stone has a much bigger historical theme: demonstrating how,
throughout Western history, religion (especially Christianity) has been the
driving force behind laws banning or restricting sexual practices or speech
relating to sex or sexuality. Stone clearly regards this religious influence to be
inappropriate at best and unconstitutional at worst. At the same time, Stone
is aware that there is no easy solution to this problem.
A. The History of Sex-Related Laws from Ancient Greece to Obergefell
One reason for examining ancient Greece and Rome in a book about the
U.S. Constitution is that this history suggests to us prudish Americans that
there is nothing “natural and inevitable” about our nation’s attitude toward
sex; instead, Christianity is to blame. In the very first chapter, which exam-
ines laws governing sex in ancient Greece and Rome, Stone argues that the
Western world did not always regard sex as “bound up with questions of sin,
shame, or religion” but rather regarded sex as “a natural and positive part of
human experience” (p. 4). As Stone says of the ancient Greeks, “eros was a
primal force which permeated all facets of life” (pp. 5, 7). Prostitution, por-
nography, masturbation, sex toys, and premarital and extramarital affairs
were prevalent. Abortion and contraceptive use in ancient Greece and Rome
was common (pp. 7, 11). Married and unmarried men alike had sexual rela-
tionships with adolescent boys (p. 7). Although not as public as male same-
sex behavior, women also had same-sex relationships in the ancient world
(pp. 8, 11). Stone almost gleefully tells us about the bawdy, graphic art and
literature of ancient Greek and Roman times and even includes some photo-
graphs of the artwork in case we doubted him.44 In an interview about this
43. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
44. See, e.g., pp. 5–9.
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book, he said that the ancient times look “a lot more like our world today”
than we might have imagined; the 1950s are not the historical norm.45
One complication in the historical argument that the ancient Greek and
Romans embraced sexual freedom is that there were some limits. For exam-
ple, same-sex relationships between men were celebrated, but only when one
of the partners was an adolescent boy (p. 8). Stone states that there is some
evidence of same-sex marriages in Rome but admits that such evidence is
“inconclusive” (p. 9). Stone’s analysis of ancient Hebraic law reveals similar
limitations. Although that law said nothing about masturbation, oral or anal
sex, contraception, pornography, or abortion, this tradition, like the Greek
and Roman traditions, forbade adultery by married women in order to pro-
tect “the husband’s property rights and the need to protect a family’s inheri-
tance from illegitimate heirs” (p. 12). Indeed, such a transgression was not
merely criminal; it was subject to the death penalty (p. 13). After the Jewish
exile in the eighth century BCE, Jews adopted many more rules and rituals,
including the condemnation of same-sex sex, although Stone reports there is
little evidence this behavior was ever subjected to serious or systematic pun-
ishment (pp. 12–13).
Stone recognizes that early Western civilizations had some limits on sex-
ual freedom, but these limits do not undermine his broader thesis that there
was never anything inevitable about Western culture’s adoption of more re-
strictive views on sex and sexual expression. What appears to be to blame is
the rise of Christianity: “As the Church expanded its power and influence,
sex was transmogrified from a natural part of life into something shameful
and filthy” (p. 40). Stone focuses particularly on Saint Augustine, who “crys-
tallized the early Christian understanding of sex and who, in so doing, ulti-
mately helped shape traditional American views of sexuality more than a
millennium later” (p. 17). Augustine argued that it was essential for Chris-
tians to repudiate the sexual desire that led to the fall of man in the Garden
of Eden. (pp. 18–19). Augustine’s “bleak vision of human nature” (p. 23),
which “condemned all sexual desire and pleasure—for the married and un-
married alike,” took root in the western Christian tradition (pp. 20–21).
By the Middle Ages, “attitudes toward sex reflected an uneasy mix of
severe repression and earthy lust” (p. 29). The church condemned all forms
of “unnatural sex,” including incest, oral and anal sex, bestiality, and mas-
turbation (pp. 29–30). The only sanctioned sex was between married people
for reproductive purposes, and only when performed in the missionary po-
sition (p. 29). Because sex was permissible for reproductive purposes only,
contraception was forbidden, and abortion was not allowed forty days after
conception (when it was believed to have obtained a soul) (p. 34). Initially,
Christianity condemned all forms of sodomy, regardless of the sex of the
45. Interview by Michael Gerhardt with Geoffrey Stone in Philadelphia, Pa., at 6:55
(Mar. 31, 2014), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/live-video-12-p.m.-geoffrey-stone-sex-re
ligion-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/F6CZ-RUPR].
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partners involved, but then came to regard male same-sex sodomy as partic-
ularly condemnable (pp. 34–39). In the Middle Ages, through the Renais-
sance, and especially during the Reformation, sodomy between men was
often punished with death (p. 39). At the same time, laypeople continued to
engage in sex outside marriage, and literature was full of descriptions of
human sexuality of all stripes (p. 29).
During the Enlightenment, the pendulum swung back to a more per-
missive attitude to sexuality. Stone tells us that the English common law was
concerned with only very limited types of sexual activity, such as sex acts
involving children, animals, the use of force, or that occurred in public
(p. 49). Prostitution, adultery, and pornography were prevalent as the Brit-
ish embraced the innate sexual nature of human beings (pp. 50–51). Abor-
tion was permitted until “quickening” (p. 53). Although sodomy was
outlawed, the crime was not limited to male same-sex relations, and in any
event, the law was rarely enforced (p. 53). The first obscenity prosecution in
1708 ended with a dismissal of the indictment; the rest of the seventeenth
century saw only a handful of prosecutions and minimal punishments.
(pp. 59–61).
The Puritans believed the civil law should be much more restrictive, and
they brought this view with them to the United States (pp. 49–50, 76–77).
For the Puritans, religion played a crucially important role in the legal sys-
tem. The law was used to “control[ ] social deviancy,” and the punishment
for transgressions emphasized “retribution, humiliation, and shame”
(p. 74). Any sex outside of marriage was condemned; capital punishment
was imposed for adultery, sodomy, and bestiality (p. 77).
Over time, however, the Puritans’ efforts to impose rigid moral laws
through the secular law began to fail. Newcomers to the colonies resisted
attempts to rein in sexual sinning through secular laws (p. 79). Prostitution
blossomed; adultery became much more common (pp. 79–80). In addition,
pornographic publications flooded their shores, contributing to—or at the
very least reflecting—the Puritans’ losing battle against sexual sins (p. 80).
During the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s, evangelical ministers
attempted to renew the condemnation of sexual vices, but these efforts ulti-
mately failed (p. 81). By the time of the nation’s founding, the secular law
often still prohibited things like adultery and sodomy, but the crimes were
never (or hardly ever) invoked in prosecutions.46 Pornography was widely
available and not subject to any legal limitations, even though the law pro-
hibited blasphemy and heresy (p. 83).
A central argument of Stone’s work is that Puritans did not actually
dominate our country at the time the framers were writing the Constitution.
By the time of the founding, the Puritans had lost their battle to constrain
sexuality through secular law. Many of the central framers were deists. Relig-
ion and churchgoing were important to them, but they did not adhere to
rigid religious laws or seek to impose their religious values on others
46. See, e.g., p. 85.
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through the secular laws.47 Instead, the tide had shifted yet again to a much
more tolerant approach to sexuality, where, as in ancient Greece and Rome,
sex was regarded “as a natural part of human life,” and the government
“abandoned the use of the criminal law to enforce moral and religious sex-
ual norms” (p. 87). Stone concludes that it is therefore inaccurate to argue
that the United States is a “Christian nation.”
After the Civil War, however, the religious zeal of the Second Great
Awakening gave rise to the evangelist Anthony Comstock, who successfully
advocated for restrictive laws on abortion, sex toys, obscenity, contraception,
and prostitution (pp. 158–59). One of the great contributions of Stone’s
book is to connect the development of obscenity laws with the rise of other
sexually restrictive laws and to connect both sets of laws with religion. Quot-
ing with approval from Louis Henkin’s famous article on obscenity from
1963, Stone reports that the idea of the government banning obscene expres-
sion “was rooted in ‘aspirations to holiness’ and was directly related ‘to laws
against sacrilege and blasphemy.’ ”48 Laws against obscenity developed dur-
ing the Second Great Awakening from roughly the 1790s to the 1840s, at the
same time evangelical Christians developed the narrative that America is a
“Christian nation” and successfully lobbied for the passage of laws that re-
flected their repressive religious doctrine on matters pertaining to sex
(pp. 134, 145–48).
Stone makes fascinating connections throughout the book between the
adoption of laws restricting sexuality with laws restricting the dissemination
of speech relating to sexual matters, including but not limited to sexually
explicit materials. For example, he reports that during the late 1800s, Boston
had the strictest censorship laws in the nation owing to that area’s “distinc-
tive Catholic identity” and the Catholic Church’s aggressive condemnation
of sexual expression (p. 167). In the 1930s, Catholic organizations were be-
hind the passage of the “Hays Code,” a voluntary code for movies that the
MPAA adopted to provide a uniform national standard of “decency” restric-
tions (p. 173). And in 1934, a committee of Catholic bishops established the
“Legion of Decency” that threatened national boycott of films that did not
“conform to the accepted and traditional morality upon which the home
and civilization are founded” (p. 173). In the 1920s, “an array of religious
and culturally conservative organizations—including the Protestant Episco-
pal Diocese, the Catholic Club, the Boy Scouts, and the Knights of Colum-
bus”—worked together for the passage of new laws in New York that would
reverse judicial decisions that limited the definition of obscenity (p. 169).
And in response to a Mae West play depicting the culture of New York’s gay
underground, the state legislature amended its obscenity laws so that they
applied to any work “depicting or dealing with the subject of sex degeneracy
or sex perversion,” which was a direct attack on depictions of homosexuals
(p. 171).
47. See chapter 5.
48. Pp. 277–78 (quoting Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,
63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 393–94 (1963)).
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Stone offers countless examples of how organized religious groups, like
the Catholic Church and Protestants, have had an overwhelming impact on
the political process. For example, the Catholic Church was very effective in
its efforts to stop states from repealing their laws restricting contraception
(p. 205) and sodomy (p. 249). The Catholic Church joined forces with white
evangelicals and African American Baptists to fight what they regarded as a
threat to traditional and religious values (p. 259). These groups also have led
the fight for laws restricting abortion, obscenity, and same-sex marriage.
Stone is highly critical of the role religion has played in the development
of laws regulating sexuality and suggests that there was nothing inevitable
about Christianity’s approach to sexuality. For example, he examines the
traditional interpretation of the Biblical stories of Onan and Sodom and
concludes that the core meaning of these stories was not about condemning
same-sex sex (p. 13). The story of Onan, whom God killed when he refused
to ejaculate inside his brother’s widowed wife, is not a condemnation of
“coitus interruptus, contraception, and masturbation,” as the Church later
claimed, but rather “about obedience to the law, complying with God’s
command to be ‘fruitful and multiply,’ and honoring one’s family”
(pp. 13–14). Similarly, Stone asserts that early Christians likewise did not
understand the story of Sodom to condemn same-sex sex but rather viewed
it as “a moral about the duty of hospitality” to strangers (p. 14). Even Jesus
himself did not embrace a repressive view of human sexuality; his criticisms
of adultery, divorce, and lust are more properly regarded as concerns about
“offenses against the marital relation” (p. 15). Christians also did not always
condemn abortion and contraception in the kind of absolutist terms they do
today. Until relatively recently, Catholics prohibited abortion only after
“quickening,” when they believed “ensoulment” had occurred (p. 53).
The thesis of these examples is clear: the Bible and Christianity are not
innately opposed to sex and sexual freedom. When we read later in the book
about how Catholics and Protestants alike invoke the story of Sodom to
justify their condemnation of sodomy (p. 43), Stone does not have to re-
mind us that this Biblical story does not necessary mean what they say it
means. Rather, influential Christians like Saint Augustine and Thomas Aqui-
nas encouraged the development of Christianity’s repressive views of sex and
sexuality (p. 36).
B. The “Nettlesome Question”
Stone convincingly demonstrates that religion has played an outsized
role in shaping laws and beliefs regarding sex and sexuality throughout the
history of the Western world, especially in the United States. It is therefore
not surprising that a “nettlesome question” throughout the book is “how
courts should cope with that history in a nation committed to the separation
of church and state” (p. xxvii). Stone implies—and sometimes directly
states—that there is something inappropriate and maybe even unconstitu-
tional about religious people and organizations playing a significant role in
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shaping our laws.49 Stone recognizes the difficulty of nullifying laws that are
consistent with religious beliefs, but he suggests that it would be at least
theoretically possible to determine that a law violates the Establishment
Clause because it is a secular manifestation of religious views (p. 331).
Stone is hardly the first to express concern about this dynamic, but it is
rare to find a scholar who “has seriously proposed and defended” a constitu-
tional principle that would result in the invalidation of laws when religious
organizations have lobbied for them.50 The cumulative effect of Stone’s lit-
any of examples about the interference of Christian churches in the political
process seems to suggest he would embrace this approach, but he never does
directly, and in other works he has made clear that he does not.51
The Court has long grappled with this issue in its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and has made clear that the Constitution “does not ban fed-
eral or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of all or some religions.”52 In Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, the Court explained that it is entirely possible that Con-
gress or state legislatures would pass Sunday closing laws for the “general
welfare of society, wholly apart from any religious considerations.”53 After
all, the Court pointed out, lots of laws—including laws against murder,
fraud, theft, polygamy, and adultery—are also in keeping with the dictates
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but that does not make them unconstitu-
tional.54 Although McGowan rejected a challenge to a Sunday closing law,
Stone suggests that the case’s inquiry into legislative motivation offers some
promise for a check on the power of religious groups to impose their beliefs
on society at large. Requiring the government to come up with a nonreli-
gious reason for a law is a worthwhile and meaningful exercise.
Relatedly, Stone argues that morality can never be a legitimate govern-
ment interest because it is too often “closely bound up with religious beliefs”
(p. 331). The Court’s jurisprudence on the sufficiency of morality has not
been a model of clarity. Although the Court has struck down laws against
sodomy, abortion, contraception, and same-sex marriage, the Court has not
yet overruled its obscenity cases, in which the police powers of the state to
49. Epilogue, pp. 532–33.
50. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice 251 (1988)
(noting that the author is “not aware of anyone who has seriously proposed and defended” a
“constitutional principle” based on “the gross threat posed by political activities of religious
organizations”).
51. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Perils of Religious Passion: A Response to Professor Samuel Cal-
houn, 57 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 15, 17 (2010), https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/dis
course/57-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRW4-VS6D] (asserting that he does not believe that the
framers thought religious influences should be barred from public debate).
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regulate morality played a significant role.55 This tension in the Court’s ju-
risprudence has existed for decades. Indeed, the same Term the Court de-
cided Roe v. Wade, the Court decided in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton that it
was constitutional to ban the sale or exhibition of obscenity to consenting
adults in order to “maintain a decent society.”56 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Brennan argued that “[l]ike the proscription of abortions, the effort
to suppress obscenity is predicated on unprovable, although strongly held,
assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion.”57 In Bow-
ers v. Hardwick,58 the majority rejected arguments that Stanley v. Georgia,
which held that laws against the mere possession of obscenity are unconsti-
tutional,59 had any application to a criminal case charging people with en-
gaging in sex acts in their own home. In Stanley, the Court had declared, “If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch.”60 In Bowers, the Court refused to extend Stanley to
apply to laws restricting sexual conduct. Holding that Stanley “was firmly
grounded in the First Amendment,” the Court concluded that morality
alone was a legitimate government interest.61 In 1991, a majority of the
Court relied on Bowers to uphold restrictions on nude dancing, holding that
the government’s interest in “protecting the societal order and morality” was
sufficient to defeat the expressive interests at stake.62 But in 2003, the Court
declared in Lawrence v. Texas that “moral disapproval” is not a legitimate
state interest.63 Notably, the opponents to same-sex marriage did not even
make a morality argument to the Court in Obergefell.64
But as Justice Scalia quite accurately noted in his Lawrence dissent, many
of our laws pertaining to sex are based on morality.65 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on whether laws prohibiting incest, bigamy, adul-
tery, polyamory, polygamy, and prostitution are constitutional, these laws
are also subject to challenge to the extent that they rest on primarily on
55. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 30 (1973) (stating that “it is not [the
Court’s] function to propose regulatory schemes for the States” and “[t]o require a State to
structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national ‘community standard’ would be
an exercise in futility”).
56. 413 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
57. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 109 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
59. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
60. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
61. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189, 195–96.
62. Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
63. See 539 U.S. 558, 578, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
64. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and ob-
scenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral
choices.”).
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moral grounds, at least when they were first passed. To be sure, in some
instances, the government might be able to argue that the law serves a gov-
ernment interest apart from morality. For example, laws prohibiting bestial-
ity are likely to withstand a constitutional challenge because of the potential
harm to defenseless animals. Laws banning bigamy and adultery might be
justified as helping preserve and protect the marital union. It may be harder,
however, to justify some of these other laws. For example, incest generates a
strong “ick” factor, but a state interest in protecting against birth defects
rests on shaky scientific evidence, especially beyond the immediate family
relation.66 Laws criminalizing prostitution might be serving the state’s legiti-
mate interest in prohibiting sex trafficking, but it is not clear that the gov-
ernment could not meet this goal by preventing sex trafficking directly
rather than all consensual but commercial sexual relationships. The same
can be said for polygamy. Although in Obergefell, Kennedy seemed to go out
of his way to emphasize that marriage is the union of two people,67 it is
hardly obvious why two is the magic number. Perhaps Stone would be just
fine striking down laws against incest, prostitution, and polygamy, but he
does not directly address the full ramifications of his argument that morality
alone is never a legitimate government interest.
Stone also suggests that judges should keep their religious beliefs sepa-
rate from their judicial decisions. Throughout the book, Stone makes occa-
sional comments suggesting that religious beliefs have driven the votes of
some justices. For example, when talking about Justice Scalia, Stone goes out
of his way to explain that Scalia was a Roman Catholic who brought to the
Court his traditional religious values in cases involving sex (pp. 413–14). In
contrast, Stone sets out Justice Brennan, for whom he clerked, as a model of
a judge who kept his religion out of his job. Stone tells us Brennan struggled
to reconcile his religious beliefs with his role as a Supreme Court justice but
that Brennan said, “[I]t never crossed my mind—never, not the slightest—
that my faith had a damn thing to do with how I decided the abortion case
[Roe v. Wade]” (p. 395 n.*).
Stone’s analysis of Justice Kennedy appears to have evolved over time.
When Stone discusses Kennedy for the first time, he mentions that Kennedy
was raised in an Irish Catholic family but also that Kennedy boasts that he
does not have a “rigid ideology” and instead just tries “to get it right”
(p. 417). Justice Kennedy joined Justices O’Connor and Souter to “save” Roe
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,68 but he later
authored the majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to a certain type of abortion procedure commonly
known as “partial-birth abortion.”69 Stone tells us Kennedy felt strongly that
66. Sarah Kershaw, Shaking Off the Shame, N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/garden/26cousins.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(discussing scientific studies).
67. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2596.
68. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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the Court should defer to the legislature’s medical decisions and felt that he
had been “had” when he was convinced to join the plurality in Casey
(p. 422). Stone then writes, “The decision in Gonzales raised awkward ques-
tions about the possible influence of religious belief in judicial decisions”
because five Catholic justices had cast the determinative votes (p. 427).
But unlike the controversial op-ed Stone wrote about the decision in
2007,70 Stone here does not argue that religion was, in fact, driving Ken-
nedy’s vote in this case. Indeed, when Stone discusses Kennedy’s vote in
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt71 a few pages later, Stone states that his
“best guess” is that “Casey in fact best reflects Kennedy’s own view of the
right, and that he shifted from that view in Gonzales largely because he was
so personally revolted by what he saw as the particular brutality of a partial-
birth abortion” (pp. 339–40). It is hard to argue that Kennedy allows his
Catholic beliefs to interfere with his decisions, given that Kennedy, the au-
thor of the Court’s landmark opinions in Lawrence v. Texas, United States v.
Windsor, and Obergefell, is the hero of the gay rights movement.72 In addi-
tion, in these opinions, Kennedy has gone out of his way to assert that relig-
ious groups cannot use the law to impose their beliefs on others, precisely
the argument Stone makes in his book.73
With his discussion of Kennedy, Stone misses a chance to offer an expla-
nation of why the justice’s Catholic values actually help explain his deci-
sions. Although the official stance of the Catholic Church is to condemn
homosexuality and same-sex marriages, the Church also embraces the prin-
ciple that all people have dignity.74 Kennedy’s opinions in Lawrence, Wind-
sor, and Obergefell are full of references to “dignity.”75 Although Kennedy’s
vote in Gonzales might appear inconsistent with his vote in Casey, he may
have thought that the procedure at issue in Gonzales was inconsistent with
the “dignity” that we should give human life (or at least potential life). The
recognition of how religion can play a positive role (even for those who
embrace a progressive agenda) would go a long way to countering the criti-
cism that Stone appears to be antireligious—or at least anti-Catholic.
70. Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, Chi. Trib. (Apr. 20, 2007), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2007-04-30/news/0704290277_1_partial-birth-four-justices-abortions
[https://perma.cc/6VCR-4JJX].
71. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
72. Adam Liptak, Gay Rights Groups Seek One More Win from Justice Kennedy, N.Y.
Times: Sidebar (July 17, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/politics/gay-rights-kenne
dy-supreme-court.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing Justice Kennedy as
“the greatest judicial champion of gay rights in the nation’s history”).
73. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
74. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ministry to Persons with a Homo-
sexual Inclination: Guidelines for Pastoral Care 1, 4 (2006), http://www.usccb.org/is
sues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/homosexuality/upload/minstry-persons-homosexual
-inclination-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3DX-GHH8] (encouraging clergy to respect the
“fundamental dignity possessed by each person as created by God,” while at the same time
clearly stating that “[h]omosexual acts also violate the true purpose of sexuality”).
75. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–96, 2599; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2681, 2689 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574–76 (2003).
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The role of religion and morality in political debate has occupied schol-
ars for decades. Stone does not attempt to resolve the knotty question of
how it is possible for a religious person to separate her religious beliefs from
her political beliefs, whether on the bench or in public debate. It is hardly
clear how people with religious beliefs can keep religion entirely separate
from their thinking about various political issues; some have argued that
asking religious people to try to do this is asking them to become someone
else.76 Mark Tushnet once wrote, “As far as I can tell, I am a Jew down to the
ground, and I cannot imagine a political decision that I could make without
reference, at some level of my being, to my Jewishness.”77 As Richard John
Neuhaus has argued, “In everyday fact, people do not and cannot bifurcate
themselves so at one moment they are thinking religiously and at another
secularly, so to speak.”78 While the strict separation of church and state in
public discussion might be desirable, it is not realistically possible.
One possible answer, in addition to refusing to credit a bare state inter-
est in “morality,” might be for courts to be less deferential to the govern-
ment when reviewing laws relating to sex. In his chapter about Roe, Stone
argues that one reason the Court may have struck down the abortion law in
Roe is because they “clearly understood the central role that religion played
in the opposition to abortion, and this concern may well have made them
more reluctant than usual to defer to the ‘ordinary’ workings of the legisla-
tive process” (p. 398). This level of deference can make a big difference to
the outcome of a case. For example, in Gonzales v. Carhardt, Justice Kennedy
unquestionably accepted the government’s specious arguments that the pro-
cedure at issue was not medically necessary to protect the health of women
and that women come to regret their abortions.79 In Obergefell, in contrast,
Kennedy was not as deferential to the arguments that same-sex marriage
would undermine the institution of marriage and cause harm to children.80
III. Focus on Sex Roles and Equal Protection Instead
Although Stone’s primary focus is on the role that religion has played in
shaping laws relating to sex, another theme emerges, although somewhat less
76. Micheal Sandal, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 10–11 (1982).
77. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1131, 1131 (1989) (reviewing
Greenawalt, supra note 50).
78. Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square 25 (1984).
79. 550 U.S. 124, 161–64 (2007). In the past, Stone has criticized Justice Kennedy’s ac-
ceptance of questionable government arguments in Gonzalez: “Among Congress’s clearly erro-
neous ‘findings’ were its assertions that no medical schools provide instruction on intact
D & E [dilation and evaculation], that intact D & E is never necessary to safeguard the health
of the woman, and that intact D & E is less safe than alternative procedures. Each of these
‘findings’ was and is false.” Stone, supra note 70.
80. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588, 2594 (recognizing that the belief that same-sex mar-
riage “would demean a timeless institution” is held “in good faith by reasonable people” but
placing much more emphasis on the viewpoint of the petitioners who “seek [marriage] for
themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities”).
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overtly: the role societal understandings of sex and gender roles has played
in the development of sex-related laws throughout Western history.
The differences between the sexual freedoms of men and women are
apparent from the beginning of Stone’s book. Although women (and their
partners) may have historically enjoyed the right to use contraception and
obtain abortions (at least before quickening), they enjoyed much less sexual
freedom than men.81 Only Greek men were allowed to have premarital and
extramarital affairs; married women could not because they needed to bear
heirs for their husbands (p. 7). Although Greek literature portrayed women
as “immoderately fond of sex,” Greek men primarily obtained their sexual
pleasure outside of marriage (p. 7). Stone tells us that male same-sex adult-
to-youth relationships were considered the ideal sort of love because
“women were inferior beings who were inappropriate objects of the finer
feelings. A man who wanted to love truly had to love another male” (p. 8).
Early Romans regarded the Greeks as “effeminate” (p. 9).
We also learn that the ancient cultures had very rigid views on sex roles.
We learn in Stone’s history that the reason same-sex couplings between
adult men were regarded as disgusting was because in such a relationship,
one man was penetrated like a woman (pp. 8, 10). This cultural attitude that
“men should be men” permeated the society. Stone tells us that the Greeks
condemned men who acted or appeared effeminate because such a bearing
was “incompatible with a man’s role as defender of the state” (p. 8). The
Romans ridiculed men as “mollis” (soft) if they “curled their hair or used
depilatories, lavish oils, and perfumes” (p. 10).
The dual standard for men and women continued throughout most of
the history Stone covers. In the Enlightenment, for example, men were ex-
pected to have sexual experience before their marriages, while women were
“expected to be virgin[s] on [their] wedding night” (p. 68). The Puritans
treated sex between a married woman and a man not her husband much
more severely than sex between a married man and a single woman (p. 77).
The idea of women as the temptress Eve pervades Western history. In
the Middle Ages, when much more repressive attitudes towards sexuality
dominated, women were regarded as sexually insatiable, irrational, and lack-
ing in self-discipline (p. 32). Their carnal natures posed a moral danger to
men and had to be strictly controlled (p. 32). Evangelists in the Second
Great Awakening used the vision of Eve to argue for laws banning birth
control, arguing that without the fear of pregnancy, women would be unable
to control their lustful natures (p. 146).
Interestingly, Stone’s history shows that sex between women was not
regarded with the same kind of condemnation as sex between men. The
medieval church did not seem particularly concerned about sex between
women; indeed, Stone tells us that although there were a handful of prosecu-
tions, most men regarded female same-sex sex as “amusing” because they
thought women needed a man’s penis to be truly satisfied (p. 39). In the
81. It might be worth mentioning that Greek mythology celebrates Zeus’s rape of various
women.
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Enlightenment, sex between women did not meet with religious condemna-
tion because, lacking the involvement of a penis, it was not regarded as sex at
all (p. 55). Sodomy between men was still largely regarded as “repugnant,”
while depictions of sex between women appeared in popular literature with-
out a stir (p. 69). Even the sodomy statute at issue in Bowers did not apply to
lesbian activity until it was amended in 1968.82
This double standard for men and women pervades the entire historical
telling. Stone tells us that the right of men to control their wives dictated
prosecutorial priorities in the Middle Ages. Although during this time forni-
cation of almost all kinds (except in marriage for procreative purposes) was
condemned, fornication was prosecuted only when it implicated “the rights
of other men to the faithfulness of their wives or the virginity of their
daughters” (p. 32). And more often it was the women who were prosecuted,
not only because pregnancy made it easier to prove the crime but also be-
cause women were considered more blameworthy than their male partners
(p. 32). Although we are told that “[e]ven wives openly committed adultery”
in the late 1600s (p. 50), openly sexual women were regarded as “wantons
and whores” (p. 68).
Concerns about female homosexuality arose only in the late nineteenth
century. Notably, experts concluded that as women became more financially
liberated and demanded equality, they were more likely to act on their “in-
born homosexual tendencies” (p. 217). With Eve as the model for all
women, evangelists argued that contraception must be banned because
women needed to have a “fear of pregnancy” in order to control their natu-
ral lustiness (p. 146). Laws against obscenity also were aimed at protecting
girls. The New York Society of the Suppression of Vice, for example, la-
mented that unless movies were banned, “the downfall of young girls is not
remote” (p. 173).
The religious right’s plea that restrictions on abortion, contraception,
and obscenity are necessary to protect “family values” reflect concerns about
the changing status of women in society. In resisting the Equal Rights
Amendment, social conservatives argued that it would undermine “notions
of femininity” and collapse the separate spheres for men and women
(pp. 402–03). The Moral Majority, which President Ronald Reagan em-
braced, argued that curbing abortion rights would “put women back in their
place” (p. 405).
Although Stone’s main thesis—as the subtitle of his book suggests—is
the inappropriate role religion has played in the passage of restrictive laws
relating to speech, he could have just as easily concluded that religion shows
a history of discrimination against women and anxiety about the “proper”
gender roles for the sexes. One possible way to reconcile Stone’s explicit
focus on religion and his less direct focus on gender discrimination is to be
more explicit that many religions embrace traditional roles for the sexes.
This opens up another avenue for attacking some of the laws Stone examines
82. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (2017); James J. Bromberek, Casenote, Bowers v. Hardwick:
The Constitutionality of Georgia’s Sodomy Statute, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 325, 332 (1986).
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in his book. Rather than attack laws as inappropriately reflecting an attempt
of religious groups to foist their beliefs on the rest of society—which Stone
himself recognizes is almost never possible—it is possible to attack laws on
equal protection grounds.
Of course Stone is aware that many of the laws he discusses could be
attacked on equal protection grounds. For example, Stone notes that one of
the many criticisms of Roe v. Wade is that it focused more on how restrictive
abortion laws interfere with the role of a doctor rather than on the right of
women to control their bodies and their larger destinies (p. 397). The prob-
lem with abortion laws is that “they reinforced traditional sex-role stereo-
types and turned women’s capacity to bear children into a serious personal,
social, and economic disadvantage” (p. 397). Stone helpfully notes that one
reason the Court may not have taken that route in 1973 was that the Court
was still figuring out how to deal with laws that expressly discriminated
against women (p. 397 n.*).
Today, it is well established that laws discriminating against women are
entitled to intermediate scrutiny (or even an “exceedingly persuasive jus-
tificiation”),83 and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gen-
der identification should be subject to the same heightened standard. While
it may remain unclear whether morality alone is a sufficient government
interest when the standard of review is rational basis—Lawrence v. Texas did
not explicitly embrace a heightened level of scrutiny—morality has never
been sufficient when a law is subject to heightened scrutiny. The equal pro-
tection arguments in Obergefell were quite persuasive and would have per-
mitted the Court to avoid the problems of holding that the right to same-sex
marriage is a fundamental right when such a right had never existed in any
society until relatively recently.
Determining that discrimination based on sexual orientation is entitled
to heightened scrutiny would not have been a particularly big leap for the
Court in Obergefell. This is not merely because there is a clear history of
discrimination against people on the basis of sexual orientation but because
this kind of discrimination is so closely tied to discrimination based on sex.
Stone’s history helpfully illustrates that throughout Western history, there
has been an effort to use the law to enforce traditional understandings of
women’s and men’s roles in marriages, in sexual relationships, and in society
generally.
For whatever reason, the Court has yet to embrace heightened scrutiny
for sexual orientation discrimination. Stone could have done more to call
Justice Kennedy to task for this failure in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell.
Stone observes that Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion “was vague on its precise
rationale and scope” (p. 488), but he seems to praise it for “open[ing] the
door” to the legalization of same-sex marriage (p. 489). Stone concedes that
“[b]oth the precise rationale and the implications” of his Windsor opinion
“were unclear,” but Stone concludes that “[n]o doubt, this was intentional”
83. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)).
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because Kennedy did not want to move “too far, too fast” (p. 509). Stone
also argues that equal protection would be a “more compelling rationale”
for the decision in Obergefell but charitably suggests that Kennedy (and per-
haps the other justices in the majority) wanted to leave that issue for another
day (pp. 520–21). No doubt, like the liberal justices who joined Kennedy’s
opinion, Stone is probably grateful that Kennedy voted in favor of same-sex
marrage, no matter what his reasoning. At the same time, Stone does recog-
nize that a decision on equal protection grounds would have been very use-
ful for the gay rights movement, which has to continue to fight for equality
on a number of other fronts post-Obergefell.
Embracing heightened scrutiny in all cases involving discrimination
based on sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity is not a panacea. Some
issues, like abortion, involve competing government interests that are not
readily dismissed as based soley on morality or religious beliefs. But in many
cases, equal protection arguments would allow the Court—and us as a na-
tion—to grapple directly with the lessons of our history of discrimination
against individuals on the basis of their sexual identity.
Conclusion
As Justice Brennan so famously stated in a line Stone quotes at both the
beginning and end of his book, “Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in
human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
through the ages.”84 Next to sex, perhaps the next most fascinating subject of
absorbing interest to mankind throughout the ages is the role of religion in
politics. Stone’s monumental work convincingly demonstrates that religion
has played a major role in shaping our laws relating to sex and sexual
expression.
Ultimately, Stone’s recommendations for addressing the unholy rela-
tionship between organized religion and laws relating to sex are limited, but
his impressive historical study of the laws relating to sex provides the basis
for another, potentially more useful way of attaching these laws: the Equal
Protection Clause. Although equal protection arguments will not necessarily
lead to the invalidation of laws religious groups embrace, such an approach
is more likely to allow the Court to avoid the difficult question of whether
morality alone is a sufficient government interest and provide us with an
occasion to confront—and remedy—our lengthy history of discrimination
on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.
84. P. ix, Epilogue, p. 531 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)).
